[TipuseiHarim]

artscroll, on Feb 15 2006, 01:44 PM, said:

Some people would a priori reject your premise given that they'd believe that these particulars were not determined by Chazal, but literally from God's Torah she-be'al peh revelation to Moshe.

I mean, you sound close to saying that TSHBP is really what Chazal determined, not what Chazal received.

Very interesting post, BTW.

In this matter I hold like the Rambam, who says that anythng about which there is a machloket within our Mesorah is not torah l'moshe misinai. Thus, anything that there's an argument about is an accretion of halacha to the system - a piece of OT created by Chazal. I'm also comfortable with the Ramban's position that Hashem gave Moshe every argument and told him to have the Sanhedrin sort out halacha l'maseh.

[TipuseiHarim]

int, on Feb 15 2006, 10:51 PM, said:

Fine, so the question, again, is where do we draw the line? How do we draw the line?

Where is the distinction between 'halacha changing' (but remaining within orthodoxy) and going off into another movement (alien to true Judaism)? How do we know we've gone too far?

This, I believe has been the central issue in this thread. Because if we can't draw this line, then what are we even talking about?

I think it's fairly clear that this question of where we draw the line simply doesn't have an answer. Drawing that line is the responsibility of our leaders, and it's an enormous one. The line that halacha doesn't change can often wind up being a crutch or excuse not to rock the boat. We live in a generation of poor leadership, imo, and so no rabbi stands up and says: Here's where I think the line should be!

We can't draw the line exaclty. The best we can do is try to understand, by studying the Torah, what God wants from us, and by studying the Mesorah, how we have attempted to fulfill His will in the past. Using these as guides, we then have to make our decisions about what is the right way to serve God now. Yes, we're flying without wires, and there is no bright line between right and wrong... that's the the world we live in, where there's bilbul between good and evil. Adam decided he wanted to use his judgment, and God has accomodated him and his children. It's quite a challenge.

Aristotle, on Feb 16 2006, 12:10 AM, said:

I guess what I'm trying to say is that there are certain commandments in the Torah that by definition are subject to interpretation of what are the norms or necessities of certain times people and places whi;e others are not. What Oneg Shabbos, for instance, consists of is subject to change under a given circumstance (e.g. one dislikes fish or meat), but what the ramifications of Mitzvas Tefillin are not.

Ok, I know that was a poor demonstration of the point, but the idea I'm trying to develope is still under construction in my own mind. If you catch my drift, help me articulate what I'm trying to say.
Maybe social norms where that is was exceptable to crossdress at certain times of celebration.

I'm not sure about your distinction. For example, let's say somebody is an amputee with a prosthetic limb. So normally you don't put teffilin on a prosthesis. But let's say technology improves, and new prostheses hook up to your nervous system. We might reach the point where psak would recognize the prosthetic as a real arm, and require you to put teffilin on it. The context that changes is our definition of what 'your arm' is. Right now, a prosthetic is not an arm, it's a tool, but at some point, as its function an integration with the body improves, we may come to consider it an arm.

[artscroll]

the Real Adiel, on Feb 15 2006, 11:49 PM, said:

It could be a classic Cheftza/Gavra,

Instead of looking at the cheftza "the clothing" You look at the Gavra "He isn't wearing ladies clothing but rather he's wearing a costume (which happens to be ladies clothing)"

We need to be a little wary of importing concepts that were essentially developed later into analyses of earlier positions, at least as far as attributing them anachronistically.

Aristotle, on Feb 16 2006, 12:10 AM, said:

What Oneg Shabbos, for instance, consists of is subject to change under a given circumstance (e.g. one dislikes fish or meat), but what the ramifications of Mitzvas Tefillin are not.

That too is dependent on a variety of factors, including the technology to construct tefillin. It is possible today to have perfectly cubical battim, but that wasn't possible thousands of years ago. Similarly, other matters have stabilized, such as the direction the ma'avarta pointed (in medieval Ashkenaz some communities wore tefillin with the ma'avarta pointing towards their shoulder). These are obviously all minor points, but I don't know if al pi halakha one could wear tefillin today that conformed to the norms of a thousand years ago.

Quote

Ok, I know that was a poor demonstration of the point, but the idea I'm trying to develope is still under construction in my own mind. If you catch my drift, help me articulate what I'm trying to say.
Maybe social norms where that is was exceptable to crossdress at certain times of celebration.

I agree with you. This is partly where the malleability of halakha comes in. We can require women to lean by the seder by magically declaring contemporary women to be "chashuv." But we can't declare a foreign prophet or god to be "chashuv."

TipuseiHarim, on Feb 16 2006, 03:32 AM, said:

In this matter I hold like the Rambam, who says that anythng about which there is a machloket within our Mesorah is not torah l'moshe misinai. Thus, anything that there's an argument about is an accretion of halacha to the system - a piece of OT created by Chazal. I'm also comfortable with the Ramban's position that Hashem gave Moshe every argument and told him to have the Sanhedrin sort out halacha l'maseh.

Fair enough.

[the Real Adiel]

Quote

We need to be a little wary of importing concepts that were essentially developed later into analyses of earlier positions, at least as far as attributing them anachronistically.

Cheftza/Gavra isn't a concept but rather an analytical tool, it can be used for anything. I don't see using it a problem at all.

[artscroll]

the Real Adiel, on Feb 16 2006, 08:42 AM, said:

Cheftza/Gavra isn't a concept but rather an analytical tool, it can be used for anything. I don't see using it a problem at all.

I'm not sure what the distinction is.

Of course you can use it, but bear in mind that it, and I'm not just talking about the name, almost certainly was not a conscious part of the Rama's reasoning.

[the Real Adiel]

artscroll, on Feb 16 2006, 08:44 AM, said:

I'm not sure what the distinction is.

Of course you can use it, but bear in mind that it, and I'm not just talking about the name, almost certainly was not a conscious part of the Rama's reasoning.

Why do you say that? The Rama could have held that if womans clothing is worn as a costume then he isn't wearing beged isha...he's wearing beged costume.

[int]

TipuseiHarim, on Feb 16 2006, 03:51 AM, said:

We can't draw the line exaclty. The best we can do is try to understand, by studying the Torah, what God wants from us, and by studying the Mesorah, how we have attempted to fulfill His will in the past. Using these as guides, we then have to make our decisions about what is the right way to serve God now. Yes, we're flying without wires, and there is no bright line between right and wrong... that's the the world we live in, where there's bilbul between good and evil. Adam decided he wanted to use his judgment, and God has accomodated him and his children. It's quite a challenge.

But then the question is - if the descendants of Adam can't clearly see between right and wrong, and must use their own judgement to know which is which, then how can they be held accountable for their failures (i.e. sins)? I've always understood the Torah to have been given for precisely this reason (there are others, of course) - to provide people with an explicit guide and to hold them accountable for their actions. It is both a fence (so people can't say "Oh, I didn't know it was wrong to do xyz") and a guide (so we'll know _what_ it is exactly that's the correct mode of behavior).

If man uses his own judgement to differentiate between right and wrong, then the most he can be blamed for when he sins is an error in judgement. "Nu", man will say, "I miscalculated...I didn't realize xyz was wrong. I'm only human". It is one thing when A and B are two choices, with A clearly recognized as what G-d wants and B clearly what He doesn't. One can then be held responsible for choosing B over A. It is another when the status of A and B is not unknown, and one completely honestly comes to the conclusion that B is, in fact, the right choice. Can he then be said to have 'sinned', albeit the conclusion he made was wrong?

[ceebee]

melech, on Feb 16 2006, 06:44 AM, said:

Social norms determine what constitutes women's clothes (although there seem to be some absolutes, such as pants on women - apparently the one exception to social norms determining the parameters of lo tilbash). However, social norms do not factor into what days of the week the issur d'orayta does or does not apply.

Unless they're harem pants under skirts? Hate to resort to an "I heard", but I haven't learned any Ben Ish Chai. I heard that the BIC even mandates harem pants under skirts for tsnius reasons.

artscroll, on Feb 16 2006, 07:47 AM, said:

No problem. Maybe Rxxx looks at fire as ____ because of context.

Look, it doesn't seem the same. It probably, nay, certainly isn't the same. But at a certain point the collected evidence accumulates and forms a picture. The picture, when you connect the dots, is that halakha is more malleable, even following correct procedures and precedents, then we sometimes tell ourselves. As R. Nataf, who I quoted earlier said, "As for the notion that halacha does not change – in a polemical effort to create clear lines between Orthodoxy and other movements – we have created an intellectual Frankenstein."

In fact, there are a number of other examples of misleading or incorrect notions about traditional Judaism that have resulted for the same reason. It doesn't mean that "where there is a rabbinic will there is a halakhic way," for if that were so then our rabbis could be mattir us all becoming Christians, but playing semantics about halakha being Platonic* and only applications changing is intellectually timid, if not outright dishonest. It places halakha into a virtual straitjacket when all evidence indicates that halakhic creativity is forever vital.

In a way, the Conservative movement co-opted the creative halakhic option. I suppose we'll need that movement to fail completely before Orthodoxy can get on with movement beyond definining ourselves by what we are not.

*Even admitting that it is a venerable and legitimate POV--but it isn't the only POV, and those who don't share that view need not be constrained totally by the very existence of this school of thought.

So has anyone else read Moshe Koppel's "Meta-Halakhah. Logic, Intuition, and the Unfolding of Jewish Law"? I enjoyed the read, though was left with a feeling that I had missed something in his presentation. (Aronson press, so beware the price tag).

He posits that "a proper understanding of Judaism requires the assumption that Halakhah is autonomous". He discusses the paradox of modelable behavior and non-modelable behavior in regards to autonomity. Part of his solution is to use a model of balance between intuitive and computational modes of cognition.

Meta Halakah said:

Although an ideal perspective is unattainable, it is important to avoid the consequences of adherence to either extreme position. In particular, the liberal view taken to an extreme runs the danger of imposing external values on Halakhah. A fefinite idea of the good, be it politcal correcness, nationalism, self-expression, or whatever, forces the Torah into a straightjacket. To the extent that formalized Halakhah is not consisten with a given view of what is right, such a person must find loopholes or later the Torah. Halakhah then tends to lose its distinctive character: the features making Halakhah distinct from other approaches and systems are deemphasized, corners get rounded, rough edges smoothed, and details made fuzzy. Halakhah is put into a neat, presentable pakage.
A parallel danger arises from an overly conservative view. Those who see Halakhah only on the local level are threatened by universal values: they must emphasize avoiding the watering down of Halakhah as it becomes universalized. This view leads to cynicism: pepole convinced that their sense of rightness is leading them astray, that this sense is an obstacle to be overcome so thta they can do what the Shulhan Arukh says without invoking other values, become cynical, distrusting themselves. They have lost their internal compass, their sense of what to do and what not to do. They must seek gurus and may even feel guilty about sometimes thinking that they know the right thing to do. Ultimately believing themselves not permitted to think, they approach Halakhah by overemphasizing details cut loose from even the principles that originally generated them.

[TipuseiHarim]

int, on Feb 19 2006, 01:57 AM, said:

But then the question is - if the descendants of Adam can't clearly see between right and wrong, and must use their own judgement to know which is which, then how can they be held accountable for their failures (i.e. sins)? I've always understood the Torah to have been given for precisely this reason (there are others, of course) - to provide people with an explicit guide and to hold them accountable for their actions. It is both a fence (so people can't say "Oh, I didn't know it was wrong to do xyz") and a guide (so we'll know _what_ it is exactly that's the correct mode of behavior).

If man uses his own judgement to differentiate between right and wrong, then the most he can be blamed for when he sins is an error in judgement. "Nu", man will say, "I miscalculated...I didn't realize xyz was wrong. I'm only human". It is one thing when A and B are two choices, with A clearly recognized as what G-d wants and B clearly what He doesn't. One can then be held responsible for choosing B over A. It is another when the status of A and B is not unknown, and one completely honestly comes to the conclusion that B is, in fact, the right choice. Can he then be said to have 'sinned', albeit the conclusion he made was wrong?

First, we are punished for sins committed by accident. Punishments (and sacrifices) exist for sins committed b'shogeg. The issue with sinning is more a matter of intention than action. For example, let's say you say something that you think is a lie, but it later turns out to be true. At the moment that you spoke, you were lying, b/c you made the choice to decieve. The fact that you falied to say something counter-factual doesn't change your intentions. That comes into play with sins as well. I think that if you end up doing the wrong thing for all the right reasons, you will face a better fate than the person who did right for all the wrong reasons, or the one who did wrong for all the wrong reasons.

[simpleTorah]

artscroll, on Feb 16 2006, 08:37 AM, said:

...I don't know if al pi halakha one could wear tefillin today that conformed to the norms of a thousand years ago.

Any issue decided unanimously by all the sages of a given period, closes the ability to return to the earlier halakhah (ta'us bi-devar mishnah).

grend123, on Feb 14 2006, 02:34 PM, said:

Why can you throw out the garbage on shabbos? By any reasonable reading of halacha that's a clear issur of muktza gamur, and yet I've seen this done by Rebbeim and Rabbis.

Due to our heightened sensitivities to garbage in the house, it is "equivalent" to a chamberpot, which may be emptied on Shabbos.

melech, on Feb 14 2006, 03:12 PM, said:

As to why rabbis aren't screaming from the pulpit over drawings on the sun and the moon, I have no idea. Do you?

As a kid, I was taught that one could draw onnly part of the sun (corner) - which is Taz's opinion. In any case, the real reason is because celestial drawings are overwhelmingly not connected to idolatry (nor to Christianity as it was in Norther Europe when the Tosafists forbade it; the worshipped Jesus and Mary were statues and so it is not surprising that Tosafists permit 2-dimensional painting of person*).

int, on Feb 15 2006, 12:21 PM, said:

You actually brought up a good point - which only strengthens my argument. If we accept that the entire essence of Torah is to follow whatever our leaders define as 'normative halacha' (i.e. there's no 'objective absolute halacha'), then the Reform movement can claim a real legitimacy. They can say "Well, our leaders defined driving to shul and no mechitza and eating treif and ... as 'normative halacha'. Therefore, we are also following the essence of Torah since we are conforming to the guidelines our leaders set." The point is that you can't argue anymore with the Reform by saying "you have distorted the Torah" because then there would be _no such thing_ as distorting the Torah. It'd be just 'anything goes', as long as it's decided by majority/leaders/etc. Without an absolute standard, an absolute halacha, when people decide what's right and wrong and write laws, and not G-d, the Reform and the Conservative movements can claim to be just as legitimate as the Orthodox.

Assuming that one were to permit by actually attempting to apply Torah to changed circumstances without ignoring some values found in Torah sources, there would be no way to determine who is right. In other words, two postions that both took everything into account but reached different conclsions on how best to balance the contradictory values as previously weighed in the sources, would be a mahlokes le-shem shamayim.

If we actually did this, the more conservative position would not be able to condemn the creative one as "innovating" and contradicting precedent (to'eh bi-devar mishnah or at best to'eh be-shikul ha-daas) but rather as legitimate mahlokes (and then the rules of minority and majority may apply).

artscroll, on Feb 15 2006, 10:47 PM, said:

Look, it doesn't seem the same. It probably, nay, certainly isn't the same. But at a certain point the collected evidence accumulates and forms a picture. The picture, when you connect the dots, is that halakha is more malleable, even following correct procedures and precedents, then we sometimes tell ourselves. As R. Nataf, who I quoted earlier said, "As for the notion that halacha does not change – in a polemical effort to create clear lines between Orthodoxy and other movements – we have created an intellectual Frankenstein."

I was amazed to realise at one point that the halakhos that have changed most radically are actually attempts to play out the same values in different crcumstances.

liorah, on Feb 14 2006, 05:21 PM, said:

Another question - is the halachah indeed regarding "lighting a fire on shabbat" or is this the only way we currently know how to say anything about the halachah we perceive?

int, on Feb 15 2006, 01:23 AM, said:

What you're saying then is that effectively there's no 'absolute' Torah. The essence of Torah, according to the above, is to conform to some set of rules S estblished as 'normative' by the leaders/majority/poskim/etc. [take your pick]. And this set S can be *anything*...even something that openly contradicts something in the written Torah and its interpretation in the oral Torah.

See above, but also see first perek of Horayos, mefarshim on Devarim "Lo Tasur", and/or Shakh's rules of pesak at end of YD 242, etc.

[artscroll]

simpleTorah, on Feb 21 2006, 08:26 PM, said:

I was amazed to realise at one point that the halakhos that have changed most radically are actually attempts to play out the same values in different crcumstances.

Why were you amazed?

[simpleTorah]

artscroll, on Feb 22 2006, 02:21 PM, said:

Why were you amazed?

Because I had originally bought into the two option debate. Either we say [in ignorance or denial that halakhah doesn't change change or we say] that halakhah changes:

1. but the only important critrion is loyalty to the "Divinely prescribed" process of change (which however also changes, so that doesn't work)

or

2. we say that it's all about loyalty to the group (and we can throw in "guided in its decisions by hashgacha pratis").

While I had no problem with arguing that loyalty to the group that tries to learn from earlier wisdom to be and create a good G-d grounded culture [and world?] is sufficient reason to be mehuyyav, I suddenly saw that the deeper and consistent wisdom had always been to never let go of earlier wisdom and insights (pesak, whether of Tannaim or rishonim, etc.) and to incorporate them into what would appear to be changes in pesak.

[artscroll]

I don't see how your third way is any different than the first or second way. I don't think anyone who analyzes halakaha concludes that halakha isn't faithful to itself and has made illegal 180 degree turns.

[simpleTorah]

artscroll, on Feb 22 2006, 04:44 PM, said:

I don't see how your third way is any different than the first or second way. I don't think anyone who analyzes halakaha concludes that halakha isn't faithful to itself and has made illegal 180 degree turns.

The designation of "Illegal" is either procedural or content based. The two prevalent approaches now to halakhah is either that

1. the content hasn't changed (and all changes are ignored or the laws that changed are understood as hukkim - example ribbis and heter iska - so that the changes can't be judged based on content)

or

2. content has changed but is was valid to do so since it followed correct procedure (eg. a Sanhedrin)

What I realised at some point is that there are no hukkim whose purpose is unclear*, and that these purposes keep being played out through the changes.

* According to some rishonim a hok is simply something that we would not have necessarily created - not something mysterious. In any case, Hazal's discussion of parah adumah simply discusses the unclarity of the etymology of the practices of the law [given to an Israelite culture that understood the symbolism of the choices against the background of the Ancient Near East] and not the unclarity of the purpose[s].

[TipuseiHarim]

simpleTorah, on Feb 22 2006, 04:40 PM, said:

Because I had originally bought into the two option debate. Either we say [in ignorance or denial that halakhah doesn't change change or we say] that halakhah changes:

1. but the only important critrion is loyalty to the "Divinely prescribed" process of change (which however also changes, so that doesn't work)

or

2. we say that it's all about loyalty to the group (and we can throw in "guided in its decisions by hashgacha pratis").

While I had no problem with arguing that loyalty to the group that tries to learn from earlier wisdom to be and create a good G-d grounded culture [and world?] is sufficient reason to be mehuyyav, I suddenly saw that the deeper and consistent wisdom had always been to never let go of earlier wisdom and insights (pesak, whether of Tannaim or rishonim, etc.) and to incorporate them into what would appear to be changes in pesak.

You might enjoy Moshe Halbertal's People of the Book. He talks about the argument as a 3-option argument based around the question of what Mesorah is.

The Geonim hold that all of halacha was given to Moshe, and that we've forgotten it, so we attempt to reconstruct it through dialectic reasoning - this is the retrieval model. The problem with it is that it casts doubt on the process of transmission, since we must have forgotted a whole lot of torah, given all the arguments we have.

Rambam holds to an accretion model, by which Mesorah is only those things about which there is no disagreement, and that everything else is layered on top of that through dialectic reasoning. There is no original, complete halacha for every situation that was given to Moshe. Rather, permission was given to the sages of each generation to accumulate more halacha. Minority opinions are preserved so that they may be relied upon in the future. There are two main problems with this model. One problem is that it means very little was given on Har Sinai (not necessarily a problem). The second problem is thornier. If Mesorah is only that about which there is no disagreement, the question then is disagreement between whom? Hillel and Shammai don't argue about whether there are 15 melachot or 39, but let's say that a rabbi today did. Is he authorized to disagree? Who is authorized to disagree? Let's say we find a rishon whose works had been lost. If he is cholek as a da'at yachid on some issue, can he be relied upon? Does his machloket turn that issue from torah l'moshe misinai into just s'vara?

Ramban hold to the authorized interpretation model. He says that all possible shitos were given to Moshe, and he was told to go to the Sanhedrin to sort out halacha l'maaseh. The authority to interpret the Torah and define its meaning has been granted to the Sanhedrin. One problem with this approach is that it means the definitions are entirely in the hands of the Sanhedrin, and God has no say. The Ramban suggests that the Sanhedrin are guided by some kind of ruach hakodesh. Still, it leaves us with plenty of practical problems today, since we have no Sanhedrin, and no Smuchin, and thus no real authority to pasken...

This is somewhat different from your concept of authorized process, which, like you said, is flawed, since the process of halacha has also changed a great deal over time.

[simpleTorah]

TipuseiHarim, on Feb 22 2006, 05:39 PM, said:

You might enjoy Moshe Halbertal's People of the Book. He talks about the argument as a 3-option argument based around the question of what Mesorah is.

My problem with Habertal's book [which I just skimmed through, so feel free to correct] is that his third option is tradition as informative instead of commanding. My argument is that wisdom is always commanding and that inasmuch as no truth can be ignored, Torah (incliding all of its overwhelming human elemnts) is commanding on the level of the wisdom/truths that cannot be ignored at the same time that precedent cannot decide for any person (posek) what the actual pesak will be.

Re: the theological positions: I have moved beyond that question to asking why opeople frame issues the way they do. In other words, what does each theological* model fear and come to deal with?

*or philosophical, historical, sociological, economic, etc.

[TipuseiHarim]

simpleTorah, on Feb 22 2006, 06:26 PM, said:

My problem with Habertal's book [which I just skimmed through, so feel free to correct] is that his third option is tradition as informative instead of commanding. My argument is that wisdom is always commanding and that inasmuch as no truth can be ignored, Torah (incliding all of its overwhelming human elemnts) is commanding on the level of the wisdom/truths that cannot be ignored at the same time that precedent cannot decide for any person (posek) what the actual pesak will be.

Re: the theological positions: I have moved beyond that question to asking why opeople frame issues the way they do. In other words, what does each theological* model fear and come to deal with?

*or philosophical, historical, sociological, economic, etc.

1. Halbertal didn't take a position, he was just comparing the positions taken by the Geonim, the Rambam, and the Ramban. If you don't like the third position, dont' hold like the Ramban!

2. You are suggesting that a truth must impel you to some action or omission. Perhaps that's so, but it doesn't conflict with the Ramban's position. After all, even defining the Mesorah as he does, much remains in the realm of the prohibited l'chol ha'deot, and much remains obligatory according to everyone as well. And to top it off, knowledge of the truth that there is no one true path of halachic observence certainly guides your actions.

3. I'm sure I didn't understand your last sentence in the first paragraph

[simpleTorah]

TipuseiHarim, on Feb 23 2006, 06:53 PM, said:

3. I'm sure I didn't understand your last sentence in the first paragraph

My argument is that wisdom is always commanding and that inasmuch as no truth can be ignored, Torah (incliding all of its overwhelming human elemnts) is commanding on the level of the wisdom/truths that cannot be ignored at the same time that precedent cannot decide for any person (posek) what the actual pesak will be.

Explanation: Previous psak - precedent - is merely a balance between conflicting human needs = values = truths. As such, it itself is not as commanding* as are the conflicitng truths that lie behind the old conclusion, which may remain today's conclusion or may not (= pesak).

(*except to the degree that most of us as humans have a need for stability in cultural norms, especially symbolic ones that resonate in ways that allow us to meet deeper needs of conection to G-d)

PS Halbertal didn't merely explain Ramban. He chose three models of interpretation and fitted rishonim into them. I can [and have] take[n] the model that I have suggested and show that Tannaim through Acharonim are doing just that.

[the Real Adiel]

artscroll, on Feb 16 2006, 08:44 AM, said:

I'm not sure what the distinction is.

Of course you can use it, but bear in mind that it, and I'm not just talking about the name, almost certainly was not a conscious part of the Rama's reasoning.

I was going through some halachos and lo and behold

סעיף ח

מותר לישא אשה בפורים. הגה: בין בי"ד בין בט"ו, וכ"ש שמותר לעשות פדיון הבן (תוס' פ"ק דמ"ק). ומה שנהגו ללבוש פרצופים בפורים, וגבר לובש שמלת אשה ואשה כלי גבר, אין איסור בדבר מאחר שאין מכוונין אלא לשמחה בעלמא; וכן בלבישת כלאים דרבנן. וי"א דאסור, אבל המנהג כסברא הראשונה. וכן בני אדם החוטפים זה מזה דרך שמחה, אין בזה משום לא תגזול (ויקרא יט, יג) ונהגו כך, ובלבד שלא יעשו דבר שלא כהוגן על פי טובי העיר (תשובת מהר"י מינץ סימן י"ז).

[artscroll]

the Real Adiel, on Mar 13 2006, 09:35 PM, said:

I was going through some halachos and lo and behold

סעיף ח

מותר לישא אשה בפורים. הגה: בין בי"ד בין בט"ו, וכ"ש שמותר לעשות פדיון הבן (תוס' פ"ק דמ"ק). ומה שנהגו ללבוש פרצופים בפורים, וגבר לובש שמלת אשה ואשה כלי גבר, אין איסור בדבר מאחר שאין מכוונין אלא לשמחה בעלמא; וכן בלבישת כלאים דרבנן. וי"א דאסור, אבל המנהג כסברא הראשונה. וכן בני אדם החוטפים זה מזה דרך שמחה, אין בזה משום לא תגזול (ויקרא יט, יג) ונהגו כך, ובלבד שלא יעשו דבר שלא כהוגן על פי טובי העיר (תשובת מהר"י מינץ סימן י"ז).

Good call.